15th Feb 2019

Your Ref: TR020002

Safety Objection to Reopening of Manston Airport

'Safety' is defined as 'the condition of being protected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk or injury'. A proper risk analysis and mitigation plan would conclude that Manston should not be given planning permission as an airport let alone accorded a DCO.

Riveroak's Major Accidents and Disaster Assessment and Mitigation Plan (TR020002/APP/5.2-3) fails to address the following safety risk factors adequately –
(i) the proximity of Ramsgate (population 40,000) to the runway
(ii) the number of schools under the flight path
(iii) the height of the aircraft over Ramsgate
(iv) the possibility of laser or drone interference with aircraft
(v) the safety record of cargo aircraft at Manston Airport and of dedicated freight carriers generally
(vi) the lack of capacity at local A&E for dealing with a major incident

Ramsgate is not 4km from the runway as Riveroak contends. (para 6.6, Statement of Reasons TR20002/App/3.1) The built-up area currently begins 1.3km (Kentmere Street CT11 0QF) from the runway and is directly under the flightpath. It is 4.5km across Ramsgate from the outer edge of the Marina to the runway[1].

RSP's Anthony Freudmann should be aware of this because the *London Manston Airport, Aircraft Noise Assessment and Mitigation Report* of 2003 was done for Wiggins, a company he was then running. This report states that, "Aircraft will finally descent (sic) at 52m for each kilometre travelled, such that at the Marina, aircraft would be 235m above the aerodrome level (54m), or 289m above sea level."[2] Dividing 235 by 52 gives 4.5 which tells you that the runway is 4.5 km from Ramsgate harbour.

The planes line up over the Grade 2 star listed Clock Tower in the harbour and descend across the town. There are 5 schools directly under the flight path. Using a scale map of Ramsgate and Google's Topographic Map[3], Ofsted statistics on pupil numbers, plus the information contained in the *London Manston Airport, Aircraft Noise Assessment and Mitigation Report* of 2003, it is possible to calculate the height of the aircraft overhead as they pass over the schools.

Schools on Flightpath	Number of Pupils	Distance To Runway	Height Overhead
Chilton Primary School	422	1.8km	117m
Ellington Infant School	204	2.5km	135m
Christ Church Primary	253	2.75km	153m
Priory Infant School	178	3km	1.86m
Chatham & Clarendon Grammar	1372	3.5km	212m

[1] Appendix *A* – Extract- *London Manston Airport, Aircraft Noise Assessment and Mitigation Report*, June 2003, Section 3.4 Landing Noise (see relevant extracts highlighted in yellow)
[2] Ibid
[3] Appendix B

The *London Manston Airport, Aircraft Noise Assessment and Mitigation Report* states that the average L_{max} dB(A) will be well in excess of 90dB at Clarendon School for most cargo aircraft[4]. The May 2011 noise monitor readings from Chapel Place[5] (street next up from Clarendon) record SEL (Single Event Level) above 100dB. With anywhere between 10,000 and 81,000 flights going overhead per year, how are any of our schools going to function?

Drone and Laser Attacks

We saw with Gatwick at Christmas time the danger that drones can pose to airports. Lasers are even more dangerous. According to the CAA[6], between 2012 and 2016, the UK averaged 1422 laser attacks per year. With Manston, the danger increases dramatically because the planes are so close to the ground as they pass over the town. Anyone playing with a laser or a drone could bring down an aircraft. This issue is not addressed at all in Riveroak's Major Accidents and Disaster Assessment and Mitigation Plan (TR020002/APP/5.2-3) and it should be.

Safety Record of Cargo Planes at Manston

What is proposed is a busy cargo hub. According to the International Pilots' Association, 'Cargo airline operations currently experience an accident rate that is seven times higher than passenger airline operations worldwide.'[7]

When Manston was the UK's sixth largest cargo hub[8], it had only 435 flights a year and yet we had incidents that very nearly resulted in major loss of life.

Examples include:

1. In August 2010, a KAM Air plane "struck its tail on the runway and the grass surface beyond the runway before becoming airborne during take-off from Manston Airport (United Kingdom). Investigations of this serious incident by the United Kingdom concluded that there were serious deficiencies with the operational control of the DC8 fleet of Kam Air." (para 14, COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1071/2010). Riveroak proposes 70% of flights will take off over Ramsgate.[9]

2. In 2012, an Ethiopian Airlines cargo plane coming into land caused a vortex incident in Southwood Gardens (2.5km to runway). The entire roof fell into a neighbour's garden narrowly missing her. I understand that replacement of the roof was done and the resident was asked to sign an NDA. Had this happened at nearby Ellington Infant School during playtime, significant loss of life would have resulted.[10]

[4] [4] Appendix *A* – Extract- *London Manston Airport, Aircraft Noise Assessment and Mitigation Report*, June 2003, Section 3.2 Noise Monitoring (see relevant extracts highlighted in yellow)
[5] Appendix B, Average Noise Level Report, May 2011. Manston – Kent's International Airport
[6] Appendix G – CAA website screenshot
[7] Appendix D – Screenshot of International Pilots' Association website discussing cargo safety, [redacted]
[8] Appendix F – CAA Figures 2009
[9] Appendix C - Extract - COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1071/2010 of 22 November 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community
[10] Verbal Evidence, resident of Southwood Gardens.

Hospitals

In 2018, the Care Quality Commission assessed East Kent Hospitals Trust as having the second worst A&E waiting times in the country.[11] There are acute staff shortages at Margate's Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother (QEQM) Hospital. How would the hospital cope with a major incident? At no point in the DCO application, does Riveroak address this capacity issue at QEQM. It is not as thought there are other suitable hospitals close by. There are no direct road links to William Harvey Hospital in Ashford and, if the predictions for Brexit are to be believed, we could be looking for a repetition of Operation Stack which saw the roads of East Kent gridlocked.

Summary

Riveroak's proposal of 10,000 flights per year poses a major risk to public safety and public health in Ramsgate. None of these risks are adequately addressed in the Riveroak DCO proposal. Manston operated as an airport under certificates of lawfulness granted because it had been used for some civilian flights by the MOD for more than 10 years immediately prior to its sale to Wiggins. It has not been an airport since 2014. Surely, it would now need to pass current planning law.

Janet Davies
Resident of West Cliff
Ramsgate

[11] Appendix E – Screenshot of BBC Report, 5th Sept 2018, [redacted]

Appendix A

LONDON MANSTON AIRPORT

AIRCRAFT NOISE ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION

DRAFT – FOR COMMENT

[redacted]

Report to:

Wiggins Group PLC
London Manston Airport
P O Box 500
Manston
Kent
June 2003

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Brief

The development of London Manston Airport (LMA) has been supported in local and county plans, and noted in the recent National Consultation on the Future of Air Transport in the

South East. London Manston has been recognised as an opportunity to develop a significant regional passenger and a national cargo airport handling some 10 million passengers and a significant throughput of freight.

The Airport Company has produced a Strategic Master Plan illustrating their vision as to how the Airport might look over the next 5, 10 and 15 years. They have recognised that since its inception as a civil airport in September 1999, the Airport is entering a period of long-term sustained growth and development. Also they have acknowledged that the future growth will be dependent on the way in which London Manston is able to manage its impact on local communities and operate in an environmentally and socially acceptable manner.

The Government's principles for sustainable development underpin Wiggins's own approach to the development of the Airport. A key element of the Company's strategy is the effective protection of the environment which requires attention to ecology, nature conservation, water and air quality, and aircraft noise. It is to that last issue that this paper is directed.

This document has been produced as part of the ongoing process of developing suitable noise assessment and monitoring methods, analysis, and where appropriate, measures to minimise noise effects

1.2 The Airport

London Manston Airport lies 2 km west of Ramsgate on a chalk plateau in the central part of the Isle of Thanet. It has a 2752m long runway, Runway 10/28, which is set approximately in the East-West direction. As is usual in the UK, flying operations are mainly in a westerly mode, with arrivals from the east and departures to the west. This mode of operation is determined by the prevailing wind direction, as aircraft take off and land into the wind.

Typically aircraft approach for landing over Ramsgate and departing aircraft take off to the west towards the the village of St Nicholas at Wade. In noise terms, the most significant impact is due to aircraft overflying Ramsgate. The extended centre line of the runway to the east passes through the St Lawrence district towards the Marina and then over the sea. The nearest housing in St Lawrence is about 1.5km from the end of runway 28. Landing aircraft on the 3º glideslope would be approximately 94m overhead if the area was flat. However due to the elevated nature of the runway, aircraft will be slightly higher over the housing in St Lawrence.

The Airport handles a mix of air traffic from the single piston engined general aviation aircraft to the large four engined turbo-fan powered Boeing 747 aircraft. The current commercial activity mainly relates to freighter operations by large aircraft, although it is anticipated that passenger services will develop as the Airport grows.

As the Airport develops the mix of aircraft types will alter with increasing numbers of civil aircraft. It is also anticipated that the noise characteristics of aircraft operating at London Manston will change in response to the increasingly stringent international noise certification regulations.

1.3. Airport Development

The following table illustrates the change in aircraft activity that could be experienced as the Airport develops. In noise terms the most significant matters relate to the commercial traffic, as general aviation activity does not significantly affect noise exposure near the Airport.

Current and Future Annual Aircraft Activity at London Manston Airport

Aircraft Types	**Current (2002-2001)**	**Future* (Mid-term Forecast)**
TURBO-FAN AIRCRAFT:		
Large Freighters	1410=	1980
Large Passenger Transports	80	840
Medium Passenger Transports	-	2260
Small Passenger Transports	60	9800
Executive Transports	100	100^{+} nom.
Military Aircraft	150	150^{+} nom.
PROPELLOR AIRCRAFT:		
Singles	8800	8800^{+} nom.
Twins	960	960^{+} nom.

*These approximate traffic figures relate to a forecast made originally for 2005, but amended to take into account recent trends.

$^{+}$ Not forecasted so current figures taken.

= These movements include positioning flights, as well as cargo carrying flights.

For commercial traffic, it is the number and type of large freighter aircraft that operate from the Airport that is the most significant. These aircraft are much noisier than the typical passenger aircraft. This is shown by the noise certification measurements. These are carried under carefully specified and monitored test conditions by the manufacturer, and are part of the process of obtaining the aircraft's noise certificate. All commercial aircraft have to obtain a noise certificate in order to be able to operate in the United Kingdom.

Noise Certification Results for Commercial Aircraft

Aircraft	**Noise Certification Values (EPNdB)**		
	Take-off (fly over)	**Sideline**	**Approach**
FREIGHTERS			
Boeing 747-200 (Rolls Royce: Ch III)	106.5	99.7	107.0
Boeing 747-400 (Rolls Royce: Ch IV)	98.0	98.8	103.8
McDonnell Douglas DC10-30	99.0	97.9	105.3
Douglas DC8-70	95.7	92.8	98.3
(FUTURE: Airbus A380	98.9	96.7	99.9)
PASSENGER AIRCRAFT			
Boeing 737-300 (Ch III)	85.2	89.2	98.6
Boeing 737-700 (Ch IV)	88.6	92.5	96.1
PASSENGER AIRCRAFT (CHARTER)			
Boeing 757-200 (Ch III)	86.2	93.8	95.2
Boeing 767-200 (Ch III)	91.6	96.9	98.6
GENERAL AVIATION			
Executive Jet	84.4	92.0	86.9

In the above table, the noise values are expressed in terms of the Effective Perceived Noise decibel values (EPNdB). This noise tends only to be used for noise certification purposes. Airport noise assessments use a range of other parameters including dB(A). For ease of comparison EPNdB = dB(A) +13.

The noise certification values include three principal measurements; landing aircraft (approach), take off (sideline), and aircraft departing at 6.5 kms from the start of roll (fly over).

When the Airport is operating in the usual mode (from the west), it is the noise of landing aircraft that affects the residents of Ramsgate. The large freighter aircraft Boeing 747 and DC10 produce noise levels in the range 103.8 EPNdB to 107.0 EPNdB, whereas the passenger transports produce significantly less (in the range 92.5 to 98.6 EPNdB). Also shown are the anticipated noise certification levels for the largest future freighter, the Airbus A380. This aircraft is anticipated to enter service in 2006, and although it will be larger than a Boeing 747, its noise level is expected to be less.

When aircraft depart over Ramsgate into an easterly wind, the departure noise becomes important. Again the large freighters are noisier than the passenger transports.

The noise certification table also highlights the difference between the noise levels of Rolls Royce engined Boeing 747 aircraft which meet the current noise certification requirement (Chapter III) and the 2006 noise certification requirement (Chapter IV). The most significant difference is the large reduction in take-off noise.

London Manston Airport is anticipating significant growth over the next 15 years. This will include the further development of cargo activity, and the introduction of passenger traffic. Unlike the situation of assessing development at a well established airport which tends to be new routes with similar aircraft, the nature of the present activity at London Manston makes projections difficult. However in order to consider the potential future noise impact and to develop proposals for mitigation measures, aircraft movement forecasts have been developed. This noise assessment is based on a airport handling around about 1.5 million passengers per year, and 125,000 tonnes of freight.

2. AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT NOISE

2.1 Impact Assessment

Methods have been evolved for the assessment of the impact of aircraft noise on local communities although the approach differs for daytime (considered as 07.00-23.00 hours) and night-time (23.00-07.00 hours). As London Manston is currently an airport without night flying, this document considers only the impact daytime aircraft noise (16 hours: 07:00 – 23:00)

Aircraft noise assessments at UK airports all tend to use a standardised method, that takes into account how noisy the flights were, and how many were heard. Noise contours using the $L_{Aeq\ (16hr)}$ index are produced for many UK airports, including Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, and Manchester. Recent studies undertaken by the Department for Transport into future airport capacity have also included noise assessments using the L_{Aeq} unit.

The noise assessment for London Manston Airport follows the same approach and methods used at airports across the UK, including Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted

(airports that are designated for the purposes of noise control by the Secretary of State for Transport. This noise assessment uses contours showing the equivalent continuous sound level $L_{Aeq,16h}$.

The impact of the airborne aircraft noise relates primarily to the general community disturbance (annoyance) effect on local residents living in communities close to an airport's boundary or in areas that are directly overflown by arriving or departing aircraft. There are also effects on other noise sensitive buildings such as schools, hospitals and recreational areas. This report primarily considers residential disturbance, however in future, consideration should be given to other noise sensitive uses.

In considering applications for future developments in areas affected by noise, guidance for local planning authorities is set out in Planning Policy Guidance Note 24 – Planning and Noise (PPG24). This document establishes noise exposure categories related to the noise levels. The categories are set out in the following table.

$L_{Aeq,16h}$ dB	**Guidance/Experience with regard to airborne aircraft noise (daytime)**
>72	Planning permission for housing should normally be refused. PPG 24 Category D.
69	"Very Much" annoyance predicted.
66-72	Planning permission for housing should not normally be granted, but can be permitted with soundproofing in certain circumstances. PPG 24 Category C.
63	"Moderate" annoyance predicted.
57-66	Planning permission for housing to be given with appropriate conditions. PPG 24 Category B.
57	Onset of annoyance predicted.
<57	Planning permission for housing to be given, noise need not be considered as a determining planning factor. PPG 24 Category A.

Airborne aircraft noise should be taken into account when it exceeds 57dB $L_{Aeq,16h}$. This levels is generally accepted as the onset of low community annoyance. In areas affected

by noise levels in excess of 66dB $L_{Aeq\ 16hr}$, planning permissions for new residential development should not normally be permitted.

2.3 Noise Monitoring

Although sophisticated computer based models are used to generate noise contours, the monitoring of individual noise events monitoring also plays an important role in noise control at an Airport.

Noise monitoring has been used at UK airports for many years to measure the noise of individual aircraft operations. There are standardised monitor locations, generally 6.5 km from the start of roll. This corresponds with the 'take-off' location used in the noise certification tests. The monitoring results are used to identify specific noise events, and at the major airports monitoring used as part of a noise fining system.

Noise monitoring equipment has been installed at London Manston. Two monitors have been installed at either end of the runway (as close as possible to the 6.5km position). It is somewhat unusual for an airport of the scale of London Manston to have invested in a noise monitoring system, given the scale of the present activity. A noise monitor has been in operation at Clarendon School Ramsgate since September 2001 and the monitor to the west of the Airport is expected to be operational shortly. In addition, Thanet District Council's Environmental Health Officers have the use of a portable aircraft noise monitor. The Airport Consultative Committee receive regular noise reports.

For Manston noise monitoring has already been used to check the accuracy of the noise contour computer programme's data on the large freighters by analysing the noise levels recorded at Clarendon School.

It is often suggested that noise monitoring could determine the parameter used in the noise contours, as opposed to simply checking the noise of the individual aircraft that are incorporated into the contour. This is not usually possible as the noise contours relate to the average value over the summer 92 day period, and just to aircraft noise. Any long term measurement near an Airport will measure not only the aircraft noise but also the other environmental noise sources such as road traffic.

The noise monitoring equipment in use at London Manston uses established practices and technologies that are in place at a large number of airports throughout the world. The monitoring programme in place at London Manston generally exceeds that which is used at other airports of a similar size.

3. AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT NOISE AT MANSTON

3.2 Noise Monitoring

Noise monitoring has been carried out at Clarendon School since September 2001 and monthly reports provided to the Airport Company. The monthly reports give the readings of arriving and departing aircraft noise events related to the aircraft types and the airport operators. It also notes the noisiest top twenty arrivals and departures in the month.

As expected, the noisiest events relate to movements by the large freighters, Boeing 747-200 and Douglas DC-8 62F. The results are expressed in terms of the L_{max} dB(A) level, that is the maximum sound level 'A weighted' recorded as the aircraft overflies; and also the SEL value, that is a specialised index in which the sound measuring device computes a value that is equivalent to the noise level with all the sound energy occurring in one second.

Typical Noise Levels at Clarendon School

Aircraft Type	**Average of L_{max} dB(A) Levels**
Boeing 747-200 Arrival	93.7*
Boeing 747-200 Departure	87.7*
Douglas DC-8 53F Arrival	93.0
Douglas DC-8 55F Departure	-
Douglas DC-8 62F Arrival	89.2*
Douglas DC-8 62F Departure	92.0*
Antonov AN-12F Arrival	88.7
Antonov AN-12F Departure	91.6

(*More than 4 noise values averaged)

The noisiest events tend to be departures by Douglas DC8-62F aircraft and arrivals of Boeing 747 aircraft.

3.3 Departure Noise

Due to the prevailing wind, the majority of departures take off to the west over the fields, so the noisiest operation, climb-out, is undertaken away from a major populated area. The departure route has been developed to avoid over flying St Nicholas at Wade.

The further reduction of departure noise will be as a result of the introduction of quieter aircraft and the optimisation of the departure flight procedures. Noise Abatement procedures have already been developed and published by the Airport.

3.4 Landing Noise

The most significant noise effect of the Airport is the noise from landing aircraft over Ramsgate. Aircraft approach the Airport on a 3º glide slope, such that the aircraft are relatively low over nearby housing. In approximate terms the aircraft will finally descent at 52m for each kilometre travelled, such that at the Marina, aircraft would be 235m above the aerodrome level (54m), or 289m above sea level.

At that stage of the final approach the landing aircraft will need to have lined up with the extended centre line of the runway, and when within 5 nautical miles of the landing threshold, the aircraft must be set up in its final landing configuration. The use of low power/low drag or continuous descent approach procedures are not applicable to this phase of the landing approach.

The basis of minimising approach noise is for the aircraft to:

(i) be as high as possible at any given point in the descent
(ii) use as low thrust as possible, and
(iii) minimise changes in thrust.

The reduction of final approach landing noise can be influenced by the introduction of quieter aircraft, or the relocation of the landing threshold to the west. Shifting the landing threshold would result in landing aircraft being higher over Ramsgate. An additional measure could be the use of a non-standard approach glide slope (greater than 3 degrees). This however is unusual and is only undertaken at airports where the topography necessitates such non-standard approaches.

Appendix B

Elevation Chatham & Clarendon Grammar



Elevation Priory Infant School



Elevation Christ Church Primary School



Elevation Ellington Infant School



Elevation Chilton Primary School



Appendix C (see section highlighted in yellow)

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1071/2010
of 22 November 2010
amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community
(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 December 2005 on the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Community and on informingair passengers of the identity of the operating carrier, and repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/CE (1), and in particular Article 4 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 of 22 March 2006 established the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union referred to in Chapter II of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 (2).

(2) In accordance with Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, some Member States communicated to the Commission information that is relevant in the context of updating the Community list. Relevant information was also communicated by third countries. On this basis, the Community list should be updated.

(3) The Commission informed all air carriers concerned either directly or, when this was not practicable, through the authorities responsible for their regulatory oversight, indicating the essential facts and considerations which would form the basis for a decision to impose on them an operating ban within the Union or to modify the conditions of an operating ban imposed on an air carrier which is included in the Community list.

(4) Opportunity was given by the Commission to the air carriers concerned to consult documents provided by Member States, to submit written comments and to make an oral presentation to the Commission within 10 working days and to the Air Safety Committee established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/1991 of 16 December on the harmonization of the technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation (3).

(5) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight over the air carriers concerned have been consulted by the Commission as well as, in specific cases, by some Member States.

(6) The Air Safety Committee has heard presentations by the European Aviation Safety Agency and by the Commission on the main operational conclusions agreed in the course of the last meeting of the European SAFA Steering Group (ESSG) held in Vienna on the 28 and 29 October 2010. In particular, it has been informed about the endorsement by the ESSG of the introduction on a voluntary basis of a minimum annual quota of inspections to be carried out by Member States as of 2011.

(7) The Air Safety Committee has heard presentations on the analysis of reports of comprehensive safety audits carried out by the International Civil Aviation Organisation

(ICAO) in the framework of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) and on the results of cooperation activities between the Commission and ICAO in the areas of safety and in particular on the possibilities to the exchange safety information regarding the level of compliance with international safety standards and recommended practices.

(8) Following the conclusions of ICAO general assembly, the Commission mandated the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to coordinate the regular analysis of the reports of comprehensive safety audits carried out by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in the framework of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) carried out with experts of Member States in the framework of a working group set up by the Air Safety Committee. Member States are invited to nominate experts to contribute to this important task.

(1) OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 15.

(2) OJ L 84, 23.3.2006, p. 14. (3) OJ L 373, 31.12.1991, p. 4.

(9) The Air Safety Committee has heard presentations by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the Commission about the technical assistance projects carried out in the countries affected by Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005. It has been informed about the requests for further technical assistance and cooperation to improve the administrative and technical capability of civil aviation authorities with a view to resolving any non-compliance with applicable international standards.

(10) The Air Safety Committee has also been informed about enforcement actions taken by EASA and Member States to ensure the continuing airworthiness and maintenance of aircraft registered in the Union and operated by air carriers certified by civil aviation authorities of third countries.

(11) Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 should be therefore amended accordingly,

European Union air carriers

(12) Following information resulting from SAFA ramp checks carried out on aircraft of certain Union air carriers, as well as area specific inspections and audits carried out by their national aviation authorities, some Member States have taken certain enforcement measures. They informed the Commission and the Air Safety Committee about these measures: Greece informed about the revocation of the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and of the operating license of Hellas Jet on 2 November 2010 following the stop of operations on 30 April 2010. Germany informed about the suspension of the AOC of the air carrier ACH Hamburg on 27 October 2010 and about the limitation of the AOC of the air carrier Advance Air Luftfahrtgesellschaft on 30 September 2010 to exclude an aircraft with registration mark D-CJJJ. Spain confirmed that the AOC of Baleares Link Express continues to be suspended since 9 June 2010; Sweden informed that the AOC of Viking Airlines AB was suspended on 29 October 2010.

(13) Portugal informed that following serious concerns about the safety of operation and the continuing airworthiness

of aircraft operated by two Portuguese air carriers – Luzair and White and consultations with the Commission held on 25 October 2010, they decided to increase the continuing oversight of these carriers to ensure adequate corrective action plan are timely implemented by these. Portugal informed the Air Safety Committee about some improvement of the performance of the air carrier White. The Commission took note of the announced measures. A standardisation inspection will be carried out in Portugal by EASA in the framework of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. The Air Safety Committee will be informed as appropriate about the results of this visit at its next meeting.

Air carriers from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Kam Air

(14) There is verified evidence of safety deficiencies on the part of Kam Air certified in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. On 11 August 2010 a Kam Air aircraft of type DC8, registration YA-VIC, struck its tail on the runway and the grass surface beyond the runway before becoming airborne during take-off from Manston Airport (United Kingdom). Investigations of this serious incident by the United Kingdom concluded that there were serious deficiencies with the operational control of the DC8 fleet of Kam Air. The United Kingdom therefore imposed a national ban on Kam Air DC 8 operations as of 2 September 2010.

(15) Furthermore, the Competent Authorities of Austria detected a significant number of serious safety deficiencies during a SAFA ramp inspection of a Kam Air aircraft of type Boeing B767, registration number YAKAM, on 16 September 2010 (1). The results of this SAFA ramp inspection lead Austria to conclude that there were serious failures on the part of Kam Air in the areas of operational procedures, equipment, system handling and cargo loading. In view of the deficiencies identified during the investigation in the United Kingdom and the convergence of these deficiencies with those detected during the SAFA ramp inspection performed at Vienna airport, Austria imposed a national ban on all Kam Air operations as from 17 September 2010.

(16) Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation No 2111/2005 the Air Safety Committee was informed of the measures decided by the two Member States.

(17) On 6 October 2010 the Competent Authorities of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (MoTCA) and representatives from Kam Air met with the Commission and representatives from Member States to discuss the circumstances surrounding the Manston incident and the SAFA inspection in Austria.

(18) At the meeting the air carrier was unable to demonstrate that it is capable of complying with the relevant international safety standards. As regards the aircraft of type DC8, it had been introduced into service in March 2010 without adequate management oversight and without any adequate training given to the crews recruited to operate the aircraft. Furthermore, these crews had yet to complete the relevant training even though the aircraft continued to be used for international commercial flights. In addition, the air carrier did not provide any evidence that the flight crew were current in their flying duties at the time of the serious incident in the United

Kingdom. As regards the aircraft of type Boeing B-767,
23.11.2010 Official Journal of the European Union L 306/45 EN
(1) ACG-2010-335.
Kam Air explained that the aircraft with registration mark YA-KAM which was subject to the ramp inspection in Austria, was on its first flight after having been parked for a long period, and had not been adequately prepared for operation before being employed on the flight to Vienna. Furthermore, the air carrier explained that, because of the introduction of the DC8, their management resources had been overstretched and had been unable to ensure the correct safety activities were conducted prior to the dispatch of the aircraft.
(19) The air carrier Kam Air requested to be heard by the Air Safety Committee and made a presentation on 9 November 2010. Kam Air informed the Committee that it no longer operated the aircraft of type DC 8. Also, whilst Kam Air had reviewed the events leading to the bans by the United Kingdom and Austria, it failed to identify any systemic deficiencies within the air carrier which would explain the identified noncompliances with ICAO Standards.
(20) At the meeting on 6 October 2010, the MoTCA were unable to explain the existence of two different Operations Specifications for Kam Air signed on the same day (29 September 2010) one of which showed the DC8 and the other which had the DC8 removed. It was therefore unclear whether Kam Air was approved to conduct operations with aircraft of type DC8 from that date. Furthermore, MoTCA was not able to demonstrate the results of any certification and surveillance activities carried out on Kam Air.
(21) In view of these findings, on the basis of the common criteria it is assessed that the air carrier Kam Air does not comply with the common criteria and should be therefore placed on Annex A.
Overall safety oversight of air carriers from Afghanistan
(22) There is verified evidence that the competent authorities of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are currently not capable to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards and to oversee the aircraft used by the air carriers under its regulatory authority in accordance with its obligations under the Chicago Convention. As presented by MoTCA on 6 October 2010, the authority has currently considerable difficulties to comply with its international obligations in all critical elements of a safety system. It is currently totally reliant on the expertise provided by ICAO to conduct inspections, and stated that, because of that lack of qualified staff, it had issued Certificates of Airworthiness to some aircraft without conducting the relevant inspections. In addition, primary legislation concerning aircraft operations was outdated (1972); a draft law had been submitted to the Government for approval without any indication of date of adoption. Furthermore operational regulations had only non-binding nature (advisory circulars).

Appendix D


Aviation Safety Network > ASN
Addressing Cargo Safety and Sec
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Air Line Pilots Association, International
ADVANCING AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY SINCE 1931
Blog
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About ALPA
Advocacy
News & Events
Pilot Resources
Addressing Cargo Safety and Security
Many of the safety and security layers working to protect our passenger airline industry are absent from all-cargo operations. Cargo airlines fly the same aircraft, take off from the same airports, utilize the same airspace, and fly over the same cities as passenger aircraft. From a safety and security standpoint, there is every reason to hold cargo operations to the same standards as passenger operations. Cargo airline operations currently experience an accident rate that is seven times higher than passenger airline operations worldwide.
Security Standards Should Be Equal
Cargo Safety and Security
Flag-of-Convenience Schemes
Maintaining Safety Standards
Pilot Supply and the Future of the Profession
Safe Shipment of Hazardous Materials
Secondary Barriers
Single-Pilot Operations
State-Owned Enterprises
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
State of Our Skies: Canada
On Our Radar
Cybersecurity
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO)
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Appendix E


safety definition - Google Search
East Kent Hospital Trust 'still nee
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-45409551
Data obtained by the BBC in April revealed East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust's record of dealing with A&E patients within the required four hours was worse than those in all but one other trust in England.
The 10 worst A&Es for waits revealed
A&E nurses face 'atrocious conditions'
Concern at conditions was also highlighted in a leaked internal letter following the death of a patient at the hospital earlier this year.
In the CQC's latest report, following an inspection in May, it says the trust - whose five hospitals include the William Harvey in Ashford, Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother Hospital in Margate and the Kent and Canterbury Hospital - had again failed to meet the standard in the year from February 2017 to January 2018.
The report said bottlenecks in emergency departments were created by a shortage of beds in other departments.
Inspectors also expressed concern at facilities at the William Harvey, where the environment "did not always enhance patient safety, with the major treatment area and children's treatment area too small for the numbers of patients".
In a hurry? Here's what you need to know this morning
THE CLIMATE IS CHANGING
Climate strikes: Will they have an impact?
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Appendix F

Freight by Aircraft Configuration 2009 (a)
Comparison with Previous Year
Tonnes

Table 15

	Passenger Aircraft			Cargo Aircraft			Total		
	2009	2008	Percentage Change	2009	2008	Percentage Change	2009	2008	Percentage Change
London Area Airports									
GATWICK	74 239	102 767	-28	440	4 935	-91	74 680	107 702	-31
HEATHROW	1 200 759	1 315 070	-9	76 891	81 984	-6	1 277 650	1 397 054	-9
LUTON	710	2 352	-70	27 933	38 166	-27	28 643	40 518	-29
SOUTHEND	-	-	..	-	16	..	-	16	..
STANSTED	1 818	1 434	27	180 992	196 304	-8	182 810	197 738	-8
Total London Area Airports	1 277 526	1 421 622	-10	286 257	321 406	-11	1 563 783	1 743 028	-10
Other UK Airports									
ABERDEEN	1 454	1 965	-26	2 369	2 041	16	3 822	4 006	-5
BARRA	30	34	-12	-	-	..	30	34	-12
BELFAST CITY (GEORGE BEST)	138	168	-18	-	-	..	138	168	-18
BELFAST INTERNATIONAL	183	322	-43	29 620	35 792	-17	29 804	36 115	-17
BENBECULA	224	235	-5	-	-	..	224	235	-5
BIRMINGHAM	11 672	10 644	10	1 398	1 548	-10	13 070	12 192	7
BELFAST INTERNATIONAL	183	322	-43	29 620	35 792	-17	29 804	36 115	-17
BENBECULA	224	235	-5	-	-	..	224	235	-5
BIRMINGHAM	11 672	10 644	10	1 398	1 548	-10	13 070	12 192	7
BLACKPOOL	46	47	-2	-	-	..	46	47	-2
BOURNEMOUTH	4	17	-76	-	-	..	4	17	-76
BRISTOL	-	3	..	-	-	..	-	3	..
CAMBRIDGE	9	5	80	6	12	-50	15	18	-17
CAMPBELTOWN	1	1	-	-	-	..	1	1	-
CARDIFF WALES	24	49	-51	155	1 285	-88	178	1 334	-87
COVENTRY	-	-	..	2 440	5 921	-59	2 440	5 921	-59
DONCASTER SHEFFIELD	3	9	-67	341	1 341	-75	344	1 350	-75
DURHAM TEES VALLEY	-	-	..	298	290	3	298	290	3
EAST MIDLANDS INTERNATIONAL	56	54	4	255 065	261 453	-2	255 121	261 507	-2
EDINBURGH	382	201	90	23 409	12 217	92	23 791	12 418	92
EXETER	24	47	-49	1	-	..	25	47	-47
GLASGOW	1 340	2 458	-45	994	1 088	-9	2 334	3 546	-34
HUMBERSIDE	161	137	18	80	31	158	241	168	43
INVERNESS	452	526	-14	-	-	..	452	526	-14
ISLAY	229	275	-17	-	-	..	229	275	-17
ISLES OF SCILLY (ST.MARYS)	131	164	-20	12	17	-29	143	181	-21
ISLES OF SCILLY (TRESCO)	29	38	-24	-	-	..	29	38	-24
KENT INTERNATIONAL	-	-	..	30 038	25 673	17	30 038	25 673	17
KIRKWALL	89	106	-16	-	-	..	89	106	-16
LANDS END (ST JUST)	10	7	43	10	11	-9	20	18	11
LEEDS BRADFORD	359	334	7	-	-	..	359	334	7
LIVERPOOL	207	187	11	57	3 552	-98	264	3 740	-93
MANCHESTER	58 689	78 022	-25	43 854	63 759	-31	102 543	141 781	-28
NEWCASTLE	2 303	1 764	31	293	174	68	2 597	1 938	34
NORWICH	314	216	45	25	24	4	339	239	42
PENZANCE HELIPORT	156	190	-18	-	-	..	156	190	-18
PRESTWICK	37	20	85	13 348	22 946	-42	13 385	22 966	-42
SCATSTA	743	714	4	9	9	-	752	723	4
SOUTHAMPTON	209	264	-21	-	-	..	209	264	-21
STORNOWAY	475	551	-14	-	-	..	475	551	-14
SUMBURGH	53	142	-63	-	2	..	53	144	-63

Appendix G

Laser Attacks